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Minnesota "Nice"? Minnesota Mean:
The Minnesota Supreme Court's Refusal
to Protect Sexually Abused Children in
H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore'
Jonathan J. Hegre*
In July 1992, four girls, ages four to seven, informed the
manager of their mobile home park that a fellow tenant was sexu-
ally abusing them.1 Despite the girls' report and the park man-
ager's knowledge that the alleged abuser had previously molested
other children,2 the manager did not alert the girls' parents or lo-
cal authorities of the suspected abuse.3 As a result, nearly one
t H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995),
rev'd, H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996). Note: the
Minnesota Supreme Court misspelled Respondent Clarke's name as "Clark." This
Comment will hereinafter cite both the supreme court and the court of appeals de-
cisions as H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore or Whittemore.
* J.D. expected 1998, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1995, St.
Olaf College. I first wish to thank my colleagues at Law & Inequality: A Journal of
Theory and Practice for lending this Comment their time and critical input. Spe-
cial thanks go to JoLee Adamich and Chris Petersen for their tireless editorial
guidance. I also wish to thank my parents, James and Francia, and sister Jeanne.
By dedicating your life's work to child advocacy, you have each taught me a great
deal. Finally, I wish to dedicate this Comment to the loving memory of Brian Pat-
rick Horner. In the truest sense, Brian, I endeavored to do this by your inspiration
for vigorous living. I love and miss you greatly.
1. During the summer of 1992, co-defendant Willard Whittemore befriended
the four girls at Eaton Mobile Home Park. Whittenore, 552 N.W.2d at 707. Whit-
temore spent time with the girls in his garden, invited them into his trailer, gave
them treats and played with them almost daily. Id. In July, the girls informed
Colleen Arndt, the park's resident manager, that Whittemore had touched them in
sexually inappropriate ways. Id. The children later reported to investigators that
Whittemore "had touched and rubbed their genital areas, both under and over
their underwear." Id. Subsequent medical examinations confirmed the girls' re-
ports. Id. The total length of time during which the abuse took place was not dis-
closed.
2. Id. Like all other residents at Eaton Mobile Home Park, Whittemore sub-
mitted a rental application before becoming a tenant. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at
889. During the application process Whittemore informed Arndt that he had pre-
viously molested children while a resident of another mobile home park, that he
had then been convicted of criminal sexual conduct and that he had served time in
prison for the offenses. Id. Arndt nevertheless approved Whittemore's rental ap-
plication, allowing him to move into Eaton Mobile Home Park in April 1992. Id.
3. Id. at 889-90.
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month passed before anyone else learned of the molestations.4
During that time, the tenant continued to abuse the girls. 5 After a
thorough investigation, seventy-four year-old Willard Whittemore
was charged with five counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct. 6 Whittemore pled guilty to all five counts in 1993. 7
Shortly thereafter, the girls' parents brought civil claims against
the mobile home park's owners8 and operator, 9 alleging that they
had negligently failed to report the girls' abuse. 10 The district
court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and the
court of appeals, finding that a special relationship existed be-
tween Arndt and the girls, reversed." On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reinstated the district court's holding, concluding
that the duty to warn or protect 12 arises only13 when harm is fore-
seeable and when "a special relationship exists between the actor
and the person seeking protection."' 4  The supreme court then
overruled the court of appeals' finding that a special relationship
4. On August 22, 1992, one of the girls, S.B., complained to her mother "that
she had pain in her vaginal area." Id. at 890. S.B.'s mother contacted the police to
report the sexual abuse. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707. At that time, local
authorities began their investigation. Id.
5. Upon being informed of the alleged abuse, "Arndt responded by telling the
children to tell their parents, but they did not tell their parents right away. The
abuse continued for approximately another three weeks," until S.B. confided in her
mother, who then summoned the police. Id.
6. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at 890.
7. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707 n.3.
8. Throughout the time period relevant to this case, SLS Partnership owned
the Eaton Mobile Home Park. Id. at 706.
9. SLS Partnership contracted with Faegre & Lyons Management Resources,
Inc., which did business as Faelon Properties, to manage the Eaton Mobile Home
Park. Id. Faelon Properties was the direct employer of Colleen Arndt, the mobile
home park's manager.
10. The plaintiffs' complaint also alleged fraud. Id. The fraud claim alleged
that the park owners and operators misrepresented the safety of the park and
their role in sustaining a safe environment. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at 892. On
appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the plaintiffs dropped their fraud claim,
focusing solely on their claim of negligence. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 706 n.1.
11. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at 887.
12. The duty to warn or protect arises in Minnesota when "a special relation-
ship exists, either between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty to
control, or between the actor and the other which gives the other the right to pro-
tection." Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989). At times,
Minnesota courts have mixed their terminology by characterizing this duty simply
as the duty to warn, the duty to protect or the duty to control. For cases applying
these principles, see infra note 62. Because these characterizations reference the
same duty, I refer to them in combination as "the duty to warn or protect."
13. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707. This limiting language applies to excep-
tions to the general common law rule, namely, that no duty exists to protect others




existed between the park manager and the four girls.1 5 In the ab-
sence of a special relationship, the park manager had no duty to
report the girls' abuse.' 6
Whittemore determines the extent to which Minnesota's
common law will protect known victims of child sexual abuse. For
the hundreds of Minnesota children victimized annually by sexual
abuse, 17 the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Whittemore is
ominous. It endorses moral irresponsibility and inaction by those
who are best situated to prevent the horrors of child molestation.
This Comment argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court
erred in holding that the owners and operator of the Eaton Mobile
Home Park had no duty to report the girls' abuse. Part I high-
lights the four crucial contextual elements of H.B. ex rel. Clarke v.
Whittemore: Part L.A evaluates the effects of child sexual abuse on
its victims and society generally, in Minnesota and nationwide;
Part I.B discusses the legal history of common law negligence, spe-
cifically as it concerns the duty to warn or protect another from
tortious third-party conduct; Part I.C explores Minnesota's most
recent common law expansion of the duty to warn or protect; and
Part I.D summarizes Indiana's common law innovations of the
duty to warn as applied to child sexual abuse reporting. Part II
examines the holding and reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Whittemore. Finally, Part III argues that the Whittemore
court erred in finding that no special relationship existed between
the park manager and the girls. Rather, the court should have
found that a special relationship did exist between the parties, and
that this special relationship was accompanied by a foreseeable
risk of harm to the girls. When attended by public policy consid-
erations, these factors compel placement of a duty on the manager
to report the girls' abuse.
15. Id. at 707 ("As to the existence of a duty... we ... note the general com-
mon law rule that a person does not have a duty to give aid or protection to an-
other or to warn or protect others from harm caused by a third party's conduct.").
Traditionally, relationships in which a duty to warn or protect arises are those of
innkeeper and guest, common carrier and passenger, and hospital and patient. Id.
Outside of those exceptions, a duty to warn or protect arises only when "the harm
is foreseeable and a special relationship exists between the actor and the person
seeking protection." Id. (citing Erickson,447 N.W.2d at 168-69).
16. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708 ("[W]e are drawn to the compelling conclu-
sion that under the circumstances here no special relationship came into existence
between Arndt and the children upon which to premise a duty.").
17. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (establishing that children




I. The Social and Legal Context of H.B. ex rel. Clarke v.
Whittemore
A. The Nature and Effects of Child Sexual Abuse in
Minnesota and Nationwide
Arguably the most serious social problem Minnesotans face is
the frequency of sex crimes occurring annually within their state.
Between 1971 and 1984, the sex crime rate in Minnesota nearly
tripled.18 Although the annual level of reported sex crimes has
remained relatively steady since 1984,19 there were from 5,875 to
6,851 sex offenses and rapes reported annually from 1990 to
1995.20 These numbers relate only to reported sex crimes; the ac-
tual number of sex crimes occurring annually is unknown.21
18.See OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINNESOTA, SEX
OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS x (1994) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT
PROGRAMS]. Minnesota police officers received reports of 2,303 sex offenses in
1971, and 6,589 in 1984. Id. This significant rise in reports is attributed in part to
the passage of mandatory child abuse reporting laws. Id. In support of this con-
clusion, the report noted that "[bletween 1981 and 1992, adult convictions for sex
offenses involving force remained at the level of 145 to 190 each year, but convic-
tions for child sexual abuse nearly tripled, rising from 160 to 461, and convictions
for intra-familial sex abuse increasing from 3 to 154." Id. (footnote omitted). The
term "sex offenses," as it appears in this report, refers to all violations of the five
statutory degrees of criminal sexual conduct that exist in Minnesota. Id. at 4
("The five degrees differ primarily on three factors: whether or not there was sex-
ual penetration, the amount of force involved, and the relationship of the offender
to the victim."); cf. infra note 21 (defining "sex offenses" differently).
Individuals mandated by Minnesota statute to report suspected child sexual
abuse include: professionals or their delegates working in "the healing arts, social
services, hospital administration, psychological or psychiatric treatment, child
care, education, or law enforcement;" or members of the clergy, subject to excep-
tions. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 3 (1996). For the statutory text on mandatory
reporting, see infra note 37.
19. The number of reported sex offenses rose nearly threefold in Minnesota
between 1971 and 1984, "but has remained relatively constant since then." SEX
OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at x.
20. CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., MINNESOTA PLANNING, NUMBER OF OFFENSES
KNOwNfREPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 1990 TO 1995. In arriving at these sta-
tistics, the Minnesota Criminal Justice Center evaluated the reports of two dis-
tinct offenses, defined as follows:
Rape (does not include statutory rape): (a) Rape by Force-The carnal
knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will, but excluding statu-
tory rape and other sex offenses; (b) Assault to Rape/Attempts-AU as-
saults and attempts to rape.
Sex Offenses: This includes all sex offenses other than forcible rape, pros-
titution and commercialized vice. This encompasses offenses against
chastity, common decency, morals and the like such as adultery and forni-
cation, buggery, incest, indecent exposure, sodomy, carnal abuse (no force)
and all attempts to commit any of the above.
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1997] SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 439
Sex crimes are the seeming offenses of choice in Minnesota,
comprising nearly 22% of all convictions for which Minnesota in-
mates are currently serving time.22 No other criminal activity is
more highly represented among Minnesota's total prison popula-
tion.23 When examined beyond its explicit significance, this figure
betrays an unsettling reality. Among victims of sex offenders con-
victed in 1992, 90% were children or adolescents. 24 In other words,
Using these definitions, the Center gathered the following statistics:
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Rapes 1,640 1,791 2,900 2,713 2,762 2,571
Sex Off's 4,738 5,060 3,657 3,726 3,516 3,304
Total 6,378 6,851 6,557 6,439 6,278 5,875
Id.
21. The statistics gathered by the National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect
estimate that in 1993, 200,000 children were victimized by physical abuse, and
that 130,000 of these children were victims of sexual abuse. Joseph A. Kirby, Sur-
vey: 1 in 20 Parents Committing Child Abuse, Gallup Numbers Much Higher Than
U.S. Data, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1995, § 1, at 22. These numbers are significantly
lower than those of a recent Gallup poll, concluding that over 3 million children
are victims of physical abuse every year, and that 1.3 million children are sexually
abused annually. Id.
Some of these statistical discrepancies are caused by the difficulty of collecting
data on abuse. Accurate estimates of child abuse and neglect are difficult to de-
termine, and reported statistics usually only "reflect state substantiated inci-
dents." U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, HHS Releases New Statis-
tics of Child Abuse and Neglect as Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Month
Begin (last modified July 26, 1996) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/press/
1996/aprcan. html>. Studies using differing methodologies tend to conclude that a
greater number of children are abused than is substantiated by the state. Id. For
example, child sexual abuse researchers have estimated that less than one-fifth of
all cases of abuse are reported. Joy Lazo, True or False: Expert Testimony on Re-
pressed Memnory, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1350 n.22 (1995).
22. See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, ADULT AND JUVENILE INMATE
PROFILES (July 1, 1996). In categorizing the crimes for which Minnesota inmates
were imprisoned as of July 1, 1996, the Department of Corrections divided inmates
into adult and juvenile categories. Id. On that date, 4,927 adult males and fe-
males were serving time, 1,092 (22.3%) of whom were serving sentences resulting
from sex offense convictions. Id. No other criminal activity was more highly rep-
resented among Minnesota's adult inmate population. Id. Among the 227 male
and female juveniles incarcerated in Minnesota as of July 1, 1996, 31 (14.9%) were
serving sentences resulting from sex offense convictions. Id. This criminal activ-
ity ranked fourth behind auto theft (20.2%), burglary (18.3%) and assault (15.9%). Id.
When combined, the categories of adult and juvenile offenders produce somber
results. Of the 5,154 total adult and juvenile incarcerated offenders in Minnesota
as of July 1, 1996, 1,123 (21.78%) were serving time for sex offenses. Id. This per-
centage far overshadowed those for homicide (16.37%), assault (14.16%) and bur-
glary crimes (11.27%). Id.
23. See id.
24. See SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at x (using in-
formation gathered from the Information and Analysis Division of the Department
of Public Safety and information on criminal convictions and sentencing collected
by the Minnesota Supreme Court and tabulated by the Office of Strategic Long
Range Planning (for juvenile offenders) and the Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
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children under the age of eighteen are the favorite targets of Min-
nesota sex offenders.
Among adult offenders in Minnesota, sex crimes are most
commonly perpetrated by males against female children they
know. In 1992, 97% of convicted adult sex offenders were male,
87% of whose victims were female. 25 Shockingly, 46% of all victims
of adult sex offenders were under the age of thirteen.26 Ninety-
three percent of adult offenders had at least an acquaintance-like
relationship with their victim(s). 27
Among juvenile sex offenders, statistical patterns produce
similarly sobering results. As with adults in 1992, over 90% of ju-
veniles convicted for sex offenses in 1991 were male, 28 over 80% of
whose victims were female. 29 Likewise, 95% of juvenile sex of-
fenders had at least an acquaintance-like relationship with their
victim(s). 30 An astounding 70% of juvenile sex offenders' victims
were under the age of thirteen.3'
Nationally, the effects of child sexual abuse have proven dis-
astrous. Children who are sexually abused are 55% more likely to
be arrested later in life than are persons who have never been
maltreated. 32 "This is true for juvenile as well as adult arrests."33
sion (for adult offenders)).
25. See id. at 13-14.
26. See id. at 14. This information contrasts with three other statistical cate-
gories for 1992: children ages 13-15 (who represent 32% of all persons victimized
by adult sex offenders), children ages 16-17 (6%) and persons 18 and over (16%).
Id. Of the 710 adult sex offenders in Minnesota in 1992, only 29 were strangers to
their victims. SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 14. Of the
554 juvenile sex offenders in 1991, only 28 were strangers to their victims. Id. at 12.
27. Id. at 14. Specific statistical breakdowns concerning the relationships be-
tween adult sex offenders and victims for 1992 are as follows: 19% were parents or
stepparents of their victims, 5% were spouses or co-habitators of their victims, 14%
were other family members, 7% were persons in authority but not family mem-
bers, 48% were acquaintances and only 7% were strangers. Id.
28. See id. at 11 (noting that in 1991, 96% of juvenile sex offenders were male).
29. See id. at 12 (reporting that in 1991, 82% of juvenile sex offense victims
were female).
30. See id. The data regarding the relationships between juvenile sex offend-
ers and their victims in 1991 shows that 35% of victimizers were family members
of their victims, 5% were in positions of authority but not family members, 55%
were acquaintances and 5% were strangers. Id.
31. See id.
32. See CATHY SPATZ WIDOM, NATIONAL INST. ON JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF,
VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE-LATER CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCES 4 (1995).
Statistically, 26% of persons abused and/or neglected were later charged with
criminal behavior as juveniles. Id. The juvenile arrest rate among those who had
not suffered maltreatment during childhood was 16.8%. Id. Statistics indicate
similar discrepancies in adult arrests between individuals who were and were not




Among property and drug-related crimes, offenders are 68% and
54% more likely, respectively, to be child sexual abuse victims
than persons who have never been maltreated.3 4 Similarly, per-
sons who have suffered child sexual abuse are nearly 500% more
likely to be arrested for committing sex crimes than are persons
who have not been victimized as children.35 The most troubling
aspect of this finding concerns the nature of those sex crimes.
Sexually abused children are nearly 3,000% more likely to be ar-
rested for adult prostitution than are persons who were never mal-
treated during adolescence. 36
Despite the disturbing nature and clearly harmful effects of
child sexual abuse, Minnesota has only a limited statutory duty
requiring the reporting of such abuse. 37 In fact, only a small num-
ber of persons who may have knowledge of child sexual abuse are
mandated by law to contact community authorities. 38 This is so
34. See id. Specifically, 14.3% of persons abused and/or neglected during
childhood were later charged as juveniles with committing property crimes, while
only 8.5% of persons not maltreated during childhood were similarly charged as
juveniles. Id. This disparity also existed among adults charged with property
crimes. Id. Roughly 8% of persons abused and/or neglected as children were ar-
rested for drug-related offenses as adults, as opposed to 5.2% of persons who were
not maltreated as children. Id.
35. Id. at 5 CFor abused and neglected children in general, the odds of being
arrested as adults for a sex crime were higher than for nonvictims. Among sexu-
ally abused children, the odds were 4.7 times higher.").
36. Id. ("Among children who were sexually abused, the odds are 27.7 times
higher than [for those who were not maltreated as children] of being arrested for
prostitution as an adult."). The statistical disparities between these two groups
continue in the area of juvenile runaways. The likelihood that child sexual abuse
victims will become runaways is 2.4 times greater than for children who have not
been maltreated. Id.
37. Despite its promising title, the Minnesota Child Abuse Reporting Act and
its relevant guidelines severely limit legally obligatory reporting. See MINN. STAT.
§ 626.556, subd. 2-3 (1996). Specifically, the statute confines mandatory reporting
to the following persons:
Subd. 3. PERSONS MANDATED TO REPORT. (a) A person who knows or has
reason to believe a child is being neglected or physically or sexually
abused, as defined in subdivision 2, or has been neglected or physically or
sexually abused within the preceding three years, shall immediately re-
port the information to the local welfare agency, police department, or the
county sheriff if the person is:
(1) a professional or professional's delegate who engaged in the practice
of the healing arts, social services, hospital administration, psychological
or psychiatric treatment, child care, education, or law enforcement;
or
(2) employed as a member of the clergy and received the information
while engaged in ministerial duties, provided that a member of the clergy
is not required by this subdivision to report information that is otherwise
privileged under section 595.02, subdivision 1, paragraph (c).
Id. (emphasis added).
38. See id. As the statute guides, only such persons as physical and psycho-
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despite Minnesota's liberal immunization of all good faith abuse
reporting from potential civil and criminal liability.3 9
A wealth of literature40 has been published in response to the
detrimental impact child sexual abuse has on the physical and men-
tal health of its victims throughout their lives. 41 Perhaps no sen-
timent, however, better captures the long-lasting damage of child
sexual abuse than this statement made by one of its survivors:
WHEN I FIRST BEGAN to realize what had happened to me,
I remember telling people that I thought.., it all seemed like
a dream .... I was both remembering and forgetting. How
could that have happened to me? Why did it happen? Where
was everyone else? And perhaps most important: Was he right
in saying and doing those things to me... ?42
logical health workers, social workers, teachers, child care providers, law enforce-
ment officials and clergy may be mandated to report suspected child sexual abuse.
39. See id. The Minnesota Legislature has explicitly granted immunity from
potential liability resulting from abuse reporting:
Subd. 4. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. (a) The following persons are im-
mune from any civil or criminal liability that otherwise might result from
their actions, if they are acting in good faith:
(1) any person making a voluntary or mandated report under subdivi-
sion 3 or under section 626.556 or assisting in an assessment under this
section or under section 626.5561; ....
MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 4 (1996).
40. See, e.g., NEAL KING, SPEAKING OUR TRUTH: VOICES OF COURAGE AND
HEALING FOR MALE SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE (1995) (compiling
first-hand accounts of victims' recollections of-and coming to terms with-sexual
abuse experienced during childhood). Among other things, King's book describes
the emotive responses of victims to their victimizers (people who were often figures
of authority within the victims' lives), including rage over having been abused and
the psychological effects of abuse on later episodes of intimacy and sexuality in the
victim's life. Id. See also SANDRA BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA
OF INCEST (1978) (establishing a dialogue about incest based upon hundreds of in-
terviews with both male and female victims); BEVERLY GOMES-SCHWARTZ ET AL.,
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE INITIAL EFFECTS (1990) (analyzing research studies
conducted to ascertain the initial effects of child sexual abuse upon children and
families); STEPHEN D. GRUBMAN-BLACK, BROKEN BOYS/MENDING MEN: RECOVERY
FROM CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE (1990) (discussing the many inner and interper-
sonal effects of child sexual abuse).
41. In 1989, C. Everett Koop, then Surgeon General of the United States Pub-
lic Health Service, published a letter advising health professionals nationwide
about the necessity of combating child sexual abuse. C. EVERETT KOOP, M.D.,
SC.D., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S LETTER
ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1989). As stated in the letter's foreword, the appearance
of child sexual abuse victims in health service offices is of growing concern. Id.
Nationwide, "about a million children are physically maltreated and abused. Over
110,000 of these children are sexually abused. The physical and mental health
consequences to these children are simply overwhelming." Id. Koop wrote the let-
ter to aid health care professionals in properly identifying and treating the grow-
ing number of children who are sexually abused annually. Id.
42. GRUBMAN-BLACK, supra note 40, at 60 (emphasis added).
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B. Negligence: The Common Law Duty to Warn or Protect
Another from Third-Party Conduct
1. The Nature and Origins of Common Law Negligence
and the Duty to Warn or Protect
The common law rarely imposes upon persons the duty
43 to
warn or protect another from third-party conduct. 44 While courts
unflinchingly regulate actual conduct injurious to others, they
rarely require persons who simply refrain from helping others to
act positively. 45 The philosophical foundation of this distinction is
firmly embedded in the rugged conceptual landscape of independ-
ence and self-reliance. 46 Morality, it is widely believed, "should be
left to one's own conscience."47  By extension, the conversion of
courts into arbiters for the enforcement of person-to-person aid has
historically been rejected. 4
43. Determining whether a duty exists "begs the essential question-whether
the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's con-
duct." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53,
at 357 (5th ed. 1984). To this end, a duty must not be regarded as sacred unto it-
self. Id. at 358. Rather, it should be derived from "the sum total of those consid-
erations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion." Id.
44. See id. § 56, at 373.
45. See A.M. Linden, Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance, 44 CANADIAN B.
REV. 25, 27 (1966) (analyzing the degree to which common law nonfeasance has
been shaped by criminal nonfeasance developments, if at all); see also KEETON ET
AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 373 (proposing that early "courts were far too much oc-
cupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly concerned with
one who merely did nothing, even though another might suffer harm because of
his omission to act").
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is widely regarded as
the most deeply rooted distinction in the common law. See Francis H. Bohlen, The
Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219
(1908). In misfeasance, "the victim is positively worse off as a result of the wrong-
ful act. In cases of passive inaction, for nonfeasance, the] plaintiff is in reality no
worse off ...." Id. at 220. Misfeasance thus describes situations in which a plain-
tiff suffers new harm; nonfeasance describes situations in which the plaintiff "is
merely deprived of a protection which, had it been afforded [her] would have bene-
fited" her. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314, cmt. c (1965)
(stating that in earlier law, "the courts were far too much occupied with the more
flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who merely did
nothing, even though another might suffer serious harm because of his omission to
act").
46. See Linden, supra note 45, at 29 ('The common law is said to promote rug-
ged individualism and the independence of mankind. People who live in common
law countries should be self-sufficient and shun dependency on others.").
47. Id. at 30.
48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 373 ("The highly individualistic
philosophy of the older common law had no great difficulty in working out re-
straints upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from con-
1997]
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Exceptions to this rule have traditionally required more than
the mere necessity of protective action in order to find a duty to
warn or protect.49 Within the last century, such exceptions have
typically involved situations in which a plaintiff is "particularly
vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspond-
ingly, holds considerable power over the plaintiffs welfare."50 The
duty-to-warn inquiry thus focuses on the nature of the association
between plaintiff and defendant. For a plaintiff to be owed a duty,
her relationship with the defendant must be "of such a character
that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act."51
Only a handful of special relationships are recognized by the
common law as automatically giving rise to a duty to warn or pro-
tect.52 Such relationships include those of common carrier and
passenger, 53 innkeeper and guest,54 hospital and patient,55 land-
owners who open their property to the public 56 and persons having
custody of others. 57 These associations are generally deemed pro-
verting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one another.").
49. See Bohlen, supra note 45, at 221. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314 (1965) ("The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action
on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action.").
50. KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 374.
51. Id.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965), guides as follows:
§314A. Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect.
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reason-
able action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know
that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be
cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a
similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his in-
vitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other
of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to
the other.
Id.
53. See id; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 383 ("[T he duty of a
carrier toward its passengers ... requirefs] it to maintain order in its trains...
and to use reasonable care to prevent not only conduct which is merely negligent,
but also physical attacks ... on the part of other passengers ....").
54. See supra note 52; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 383 ('A
similar obligation [to that placed upon common carriers] rests upon innkeepers
towards their guests ....").
55. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 383 ("A similar obligation tas is
placed upon common carriers] rests upon.., hospitals toward their patients . .




tective in nature58 and, therefore, subject to greater social expecta-
tions of care.
The origins of the special relationship exception are largely
traceable to commercial transactions. Historically, the duty ele-
ments of "dependence" and "acceptance" arose from situations
wherein the defendant stood to benefit economically from her con-
tact with the plaintiff.5 9 When plaintiffs transacted with defen-
dants, and compromised their safety as a result, "dependence"
upon the defendants for protection was often justified as part of
the transaction's bargain.60 By nature of consenting to such trans-
actions, defendants were deemed to have "accepted" the plaintiffs
entrustment.
61
2. Minnesota's Common Law Construction of the Duty to
Warn or Protect
Minnesota's construction of the duty to warn or protect em-
bodies the same common law principles as discussed above. Gen-
erally, Minnesotans have no duty to warn or protect others from
injurious third-party conduct.62 That one's action is necessary for
58. See id.
59. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 152 (8th ed. 1992). See also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 43, § 56, at 374 (explaining that relationships in which a duty to
warn or protect has been held to exist "have often involved some existing or poten-
tial economic advantage to the defendant. Fairness in such cases thus may re-
quire the defendant to use his power to help the plaintiff, based upon the plaintiffs
expectation of protection, which itself may be based upon the defendant's expecta-
tion of financial gain.").
60. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989) (stating
that to impose a legal duty upon "A to protect B from C's criminal acts, the law
usually looks for . . . a situation where B has in some way entrusted his or her
safety to A and A has accepted that entrustment").
61. A review of Minnesota common law supports this proposition. With the
exception of parent-child relationships, all other relationships in which a common
law duty to warn was found to exist resulted from economic undertakings. See
generally Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986) (holding that Anoka
County had a duty to protect uniquely vulnerable small children from an abusive
day care provider through its system of licensure); Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 165
(holding that parking ramp operators have a duty to reasonably guard against
crimes occurring to patrons on ramp premises).
62. See generally Donaldson v. Y.W.C.A. of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 793
(Minn. 1995) (holding that the Y.W.C.A. had no duty to protect a female lodger
from killing herself); Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 1993)
(holding that a boat operator owed no duty to protect his guest from diving head-
first into a lake and consequently becoming paralyzed); Lundgren v. Fultz, 354
N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. 1984) (holding that a psychiatrist owed no duty to warn his
patient's murder victim of the patient's dangerous propensities). But cf. Erickson,
447 N.W.2d at 170 (holding that parking ramp operators have a duty to reasonably
guard against crimes occurring to patrons on ramp premises); Andrade, 391
N.W.2d at 841-43 (holding that Anoka County had a duty to protect uniquely vul-
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the protection of another does not, by itself, give rise to a duty to
warn or protect. 63 Exceptions to this rule arise only when "a spe-
cial relationship exists, either between the actor and the third per-
son which imposes a duty to control, or between the actor and the
other which gives the other the right to protection."64 The nature
of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant therefore pro-
vides the basis for courts to premise a duty.65
Once found, a special relationship must also be accompanied
by a foreseeable risk of harm before a duty to warn or protect will
arise. 66 The cornerstone of negligence law, 67 foreseeability is cen-
tral to the imposition of a duty to warn or protect.6 8 In defining
foreseeability, the Mvinnesota Supreme Court has held that "[t]he
duty to warn is not owed to statistically probable victims, but
rather to specifically targeted victims." 69 For harm to be foresee-
able, there must be a showing that specific persons have been spe-
cifically threatened. 70
nerable small children from an abusive day care provider through its system of
licensure).
63. See Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483-84 (Minn. 1979) (holding that
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a trespassing hunting party
negligently failed to warn a landowner of its presence on his land).
64. Id. at 483. See also Lundgren, 354 N.W.2d at 27 ("In law, we are not our
brother's keeper unless" a special relationship exists).
65. See Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792 ("The existence of a legal duty depends
[in part] on the relationship of the parties .... "); see also Harper, 499 N.W.2d at
474 ("We have previously stated that an affirmative duty to act only arises when a
special relationship exists between the parties."). In Minnesota, special relation-
ships have been held to exist between innkeeper and guest, common carrier and
passenger, doctor and patient, on behalf of possessors of land holding it open to the
public, and for "persons who have custody of another under circumstances in
which that other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self-protection." Id.
(citations omitted). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 56; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 314A-320 (1965).
66. See Lundgren, 354 N.W.2d at 28 ("Even if the ability to control another's
conduct exists, there is no duty to control that person unless the harm is foresee-
able.").
67. See, e.g., N.W. and D.W. v. Anderson, 478 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that because the acts were not sufficiently foreseeable, the defen-
dant owed no duty to warn his tenant of a third party's criminal sexual acts).
68. Id. ("'The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."')
(quoting Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)).
69. Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 26 n.9 (Minn. 1982) (holding that the State
owed no duty to warn authorities of a pyromaniacal youth's impending apartment-
burning because it was not sufficiently foreseeable).
70. In this regard, Minnesota adopted its construction of foreseeability from
California, concluding by example that "if a duty to warn exists, it does so only




C. Minnesota's Recent Expansion of the Common Law Duty to
Warn or Protect: Erickson v. Curtis Investment Company
In Erickson v. Curtis Investment Company,71 the Minnesota
Supreme Court deviated from Minnesota's general common law
recognition that no duty exists to warn or protect others from
harmful third-party conduct. 72 In Erickson, plaintiff Garnet Er-
ickson was sexually assaulted and raped 73 in her car while parked
in a downtown Minneapolis parking ramp. 74 She consequently
brought suit against the ramp's owner and operator, 75 claiming
that both owed her a legal duty of protection from potential as-
saulters while she was on ramp premises. 76 Relying almost exclu-
sively on public policy justifications, 77 the Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed, holding that the ramp's owner and operator had a
duty to protect Erickson from her attacker. 78
In reviewing Erickson's claim, the court focused on the rela-
tionship characteristics existing between patrons and owner-
71. 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989).
72. Id. at 168 ("In this case we inquire whether the duty to protect should be
extended to another kind of business enterprise, specifically, a commercial parking
ramp.").
73. Id. at 167. Co-defendant Thomas Sabo assaulted Erickson as she started
her car in the Curtis parking ramp. Id. The attack occurred less than twelve
hours after Sabo had been released from prison. Id. at 168. Sabo forced himself
into Erickson's car through the driver's side door, clamped his hand over Erick-
son's mouth and raped her in the car's back seat. Id. at 167. During the twenty-
five minute assault, Erickson managed to honk her car horn several times and to
open a door, screaming. Id. Despite these efforts to secure help, and the fact that
the assault occurred amid rush-hour parking activity, ramp security first learned
of the assault only when Erickson reported it herself. Id. There were no signs in
the ramp alerting patrons or trespassers of the presence of security officers, nor
were there television cameras monitoring the premises. Id.
74. Id. at 166.
75. Id. In addition to suing the ramp's owner, Curtis Investment Company,
Erickson sued Allright Parking Minnesota, Inc., a subsidiary of Allright Auto
Parks, Inc., to whom Curtis had leased the ramp, and Leadens Investigation and
Security Inc., the company Curtis retained to provide security for the ramp. Id.
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text (identifying the three spe-
cific public policy issues considered by the Erickson court).
78. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 166. Summary judgment motions were originally
granted to all defendants. Id. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Allright
Parking and Curtis owed Erickson a duty to make the ramp premises reasonably
safe. Id. The court of appeals also held that an issue of material fact existed as to
whether Leadens Security had performed its duties sufficiently. Id. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court affirmed both of these holdings, finding that operators and
owners of commercial parking ramps must take reasonable steps to deter illegal
activity on ramp premises that may cause personal harm to customers. Id. at 169-
70. The standard of care to be provided is that "which a reasonably prudent opera-
tor or owner would provide under like circumstances." Id. at 170.
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operators of commercial parking ramps.79 The court's inquiry be-
gan by recognizing that "[i]f the law is to impose a duty . . .[it]
usually looks for a special relationship."8 0 Special relationships,
the court guided, exist when one party entrusts his or her safety to
another with the latter accepting that entrustment.8 1 Special rela-
tionships have thus been held to exist between hospital and pa-
tient, innkeeper and guest and common carrier and passenger.82
Common to these economic relationships is the entrustment of one
party's safety to the other, with the latter having accepted that en-
trustment by virtue of consenting to the relationship's bargain.8 3
When deciding whether "the duty to protect should be ex-
tended to another kind of business enterprise, specifically, a com-
mercial parking ramp,"84 the Erickson court proceeded cau-
tiously.85 The mere existence of an economic relationship does not,
alone, place a duty upon merchants to protect their customers.88
To support this contention, the court cited Michigan87 and New
Jersey 88 cases in which drug store owners and municipal housing
79. Id. at 168.
80. Id.
81. Id. (stating that to impose a legal duty upon "A to protect B from C's crimi-
nal acts, the law usually looks for.., a situation where B has in some way en-
trusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that entrustment").
82. Id.
83. The Erickson court clearly adopted this proposition by implication. After
asserting that entrustment and acceptance are requisite elements of a duty to pro-
tect, the court stated, "Thus a duty to protect may be found in the innkeeper-guest
and common carrier-passenger relationship. Analogous to the innkeeper-guest
case is the hospital-patient relationship." Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168 (citations
omitted). This assertion finds further support from the writings of legal commen-
tators. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (tracing the origins of
"acceptance" and "entrustment" to commercial transactions).
84. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
85. See id. (noting that in the general context of business enterprises, the law
has been not only cautious but reluctant to impose a duty to protect).
86. Id.
87. In Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 381 (Mich.
1988), a customer sued a drug store for injuries sustained during an armed rob-
bery, (cited in Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168). "Even though the drugstore was lo-
cated in an urban high crime area, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
drugstore had no duty to provide armed security guards to protect customers from
criminals." Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
88. In Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962), robbers in-
jured a delivery man in a housing project elevator (cited in Erickson, 447 N.W.2d
at 168). Though the high-rise was laden with criminal activity, "the New Jersey
Supreme Court held there was no duty on the part of the municipal housing




authorities, respectively, were held to have no duty to warn or pro-
tect persons on-site 8 9
The Erickson court then moved beyond considering the exis-
tence of a special relationship and foreseeable harm, concluding
that "the question [of whether a duty exists] is one of policy."90
The court consequently highlighted three specific policy concerns.91
First, it noted that crime prevention is primarily a function of gov-
ernment.9 2 If shifted to private citizens, such a duty might en-
courage the use of self-help remedies 93 in violation of accepted
public policy. 94 Second, it observed that obvious causation and
hindsight problems arise when there is a duty to protect against
the conduct of third parties who are outside the duty-holder's con-
trol.95 When determining whether this duty has been fulfilled,
courts must evaluate whether defendants could have taken further
measures to shield the victim from injury.96 This inquiry, the
court lamented, is fraught with speculation and hindsight.97 The
third and final policy consideration was "the cost-benefit equa-
89. See supra notes 87-88.
90. See 447 N.W.2d at 168-69. In determining whether Erickson's assault and
rape were foreseeable, the court clearly misapplied precedent to reach a desired
result. Foreseeability in Minnesota is established only upon a showing that
"specific threats are made against specific victims." Cairl v. State of Minnesota,
323 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Minn. 1982). See also N.W. and D.W. v. Anderson, 478 N.W.2d
542, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he duty to warn 'is not owed to statistically
probable victims, but rather to specifically targeted victims."') (quoting Cairl, 323
N.W.2d at 26 n.9). Nevertheless, the court ignored this foreseeability threshold,
stating instead that "the likelihood of harm is, of course, an important factor." Er-
ickson, 447 N.W.2d at 170.
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id.
93. The court was concerned about vigilantism because "tort law should not
impose a duty on private citizens to provide their own police and law enforcement
measures." Id.
94. Id. The defendants argued that the duty to supplement government law
enforcement measures with its own policing efforts should not be thrust upon the
private sector. Id. The Erickson court seemed to agree: "To shift the duty of po-
lice protection from the government to the private sector would amount to advo-
cating that members of the public resort to self-help. Such a proposition contra-
venes public policy."' Id. (quoting Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 418
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Mich. 1988)).
95. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 167. The defendants urged consideration of this
problem also, and again the court appeared to acquiesce. Id. As expressed by the
court, a duty to protect against third-party conduct does not lend itself "easily to
an ascertainable standard of care uncorrupted by hindsight nor to a determination
of causation that avoids speculation." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. ('CThough resolution of most tort actions involves some hindsight (a fact
which the law accepts but prefers not to discuss), the hindsight problem in duty to
protect cases is exacerbated.").
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tion."98 Here, the court considered the costs of imposing a duty to
protect Erickson9 9 when pinpointing "how much risk is an accept-
able risk for the members of the public."'10 0
After weighing all relevant policy concerns,' 0 ' the Erickson
court concluded that "[w]e do not think the law should say the op-
erator of a parking ramp owes no duty to protect its customers."'0 2
The parking ramp in question was a large commercial facility in a
downtown metropolitan area. 103 Structurally, it contained several
levels and stairwells, places particularly suited to attracting
thieves and vandals. 04 These characteristics presented unique
opportunities for criminal activity "different from that presented
out on the street and in the neighborhood generally."'' 0 5
In creating this new duty, the court qualified it's ruling in
terms of reasonableness. 0 6 Ramp operators and owners must use
reasonable care, or that which a "reasonably prudent operator or
owner would provide under like circumstances."'107 Implicit in this
requirement is a consideration of the risks of harm to customers
that are known or should be known by ramp operators and own-
ers. 08
98. Id.
99. The Erickson court confined its evaluation of "costs" to a discussion of the
monetary costs involved in taking reasonable steps to deter criminal, on-site ac-
tivity capable of causing bodily harm to parking ramp patrons. Id. at 169-70. For
example, "[t]o post security guards at each parking ramp level 24 hours a day
might be the most effective crime deterrent, but the cost may be prohibitive for
both the property owner and the customer." Id. at 169.
100. Id. (reminding that "we do not live in a risk-free society," the Erickson
court expressed concern that the duty, if any, imposed on Curtis not be cost pro-
hibitive to both ramp owner and patron). The costs involved in providing a duty
to warn must be considered and weighed against the utility of the duty itself. Id.
101. "Relevant policy concerns" refers to the ability of parking ramp operators to
be free from liability for assaults occurring on ramp premises, on the one hand,
and the ability of consumers to park in commercial garages free from such as-
saults, on the other.
102. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
103. Id.
104. Id. ("The [structure's] interior, with its many levels ... provides places in
which to hide or to lurk, especially if the interior is dimly lit .... The cars, left un-
attended, attract thieves and vandals, and criminal activity . .
105. Id.
106. Id. at 170.
107. Id.
108. The requisite care to be provided is a function of, among other things, "the
risk of personal harm to customers which the owner or operator knows, or in the




D. J.A.W. v. Roberts: Indiana's Model for Special
Relationship Inquiries in Child Sexual Abuse Reporting
In J.A.W. v. Roberts,10 9 the Indiana Court of Appeals directly
addressed the common law duty to warn or protect when it in-
volves the reporting of child sexual abuse. 110 After suffering
eleven years of child sexual abuse,"' J.A.W. brought suit against
four people 12 whom he alleged had knowledge of his abuse while it
was occurring." 3 In determining whether the defendants owed
J.A.W. a common law duty to report his abuse, the court weighed
three factors: the relationships between J.A.W. and the defen-
dants, the foreseeability of harm to J.A.W. and public policy con-
siderations." 4 Ultimately, the court held that a genuine issue of
material fact remained as to whether one defendant owed a
"common law duty to report the allegations of [J.A.W.'s] sexual
abuse to the authorities. " 115
The J.A.W. court recognized that in a negligence action al-
leging third-party nonfeasance, 16 "the duty to act must arise from
109. 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 806. J.A.W.'s sole custodial parent died when he was three years old.
Id. He was then adopted by his paternal grandmother. Id. At age eight, J.A.W.
was removed from his grandmother's custody and placed into foster care. Id.
During his first month with Edward and Marguerite Bramblett, J.A.W.'s new fos-
ter parents, he was sexually molested by his foster father. Id. This abuse contin-
ued for the next eleven years, including an undisclosed time during which Edward
Bramblett permitted other men to sexually molest J.A.W. Id. Ultimately, three
men pled guilty to sexually molesting J.A.W. Id. In his original complaint, J.A.W.
included numerous theories for relief; however, on appeal, he only challenged the
trial court's order concerning his negligence claim. Id. at 808 n.4.
112. The appeal originally listed as defendants Joseph Bottorff, Gordon Chas-
tain, James Collins, Richard Francis, Fran Gummerson, Sharon Miller, Loretta
Roberts, Nicholas Sanders and Mark Wright; however, the J.A.W. court only re-
viewed the summary judgments issued on behalf of five defendants. Id. at 806-07.
Due to a procedural technicality, the appeals of only four persons were ultimately
heard: Joseph Bottorff, Gordon Chastain, Richard Francis and Loretta Roberts.
Id. at 807-09.
113. Id. at 807.
114. Id. at 809.
115. Id. at 813. Specifically, the court ruled that summary judgment on behalf
of one defendant, Richard Francis, was inappropriate because there existed "a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Francis enjoyed a special relationship
with J.[A.]W." Id. Francis was a clergyman from whom J.A.W. claimed to have
received counsel and advice regarding his sexual abuse. Id. at 811. If Francis en-
joyed a special relationship with J.A.W., then two of the three requisite factors-
special relationship, foreseeability and public policy considerations-would favor
imposition of a common law duty to report J.A.W.'s alleged abuse. Id. at 813.
116. Recall that nonfeasance describes the omission or failure to act, as opposed
to misfeasance, which pertains to active misconduct resulting in positive harm.
See supra note 45 (differentiating misfeasance from nonfeasance).
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a special relationship between the parties."" 7 Though lacking a
formal test for defining special relationships,1 8 Indiana courts
have recognized that such relationships exist between innkeeper
and guest, nursing home and patient, and teacher and student.119
Common to these examples "is the level of interaction or depend-
ency between the parties that surpasses what is common or usual.
Under those circumstances the relationship is characterized as
'special."1 20
In determining whether the interaction between J.A.W. and
the defendants surpassed what is common or usual, the court as-
serted that special relationship inquiries are "fact sensitive."'121 It
consequently undertook a three-pronged, fact-driven investigation.
First, it evaluated whether J.A.W. had ever lived with any of the
defendants in the same household. 22 Second, it sought to deter-
mine whether J.A.W. had specifically communicated knowledge of
his abuse to the defendants. 123 Finally, it examined whether
J.A.W. had specifically sought advice or counseling from the de-
fendants regarding the abuse. 124 After applying these inquiries to
all four defendants, the court concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact remained as to whether one defendant, Richard
Francis, enjoyed a special relationship with J.A.W.125
117. J.A.W., 627 N.E.2d at 809.
118. Id. ("[O]ur research has revealed no cases specifically defining the term
'special relationship.").
119. Id. (citing cases where special relationships were found to exist).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 810.
122. Id. at 809. This particular inquiry was undertaken with regard to only one
defendant, Loretta Roberts. Id.
123. Id. This second question was asked generally of all four defendants. Id.
("[Bly J.[A.]W.'s own admission, J.[A.]W. never told Roberts of the molestation.");
id. at 810 ("[T]he record reveals Bottorff possessed knowledge of Bramblett sexu-
ally assaulting J.[A.]W."); id. C'[T]he record shows Chastain had knowledge of
J.[A.]W. being assaulted by Bramblett."); id. at 811 ("According to J.[A.]W., he
sought help from Francis concerning the sexual abuse he was suffering from
Bramblett and others.").
124. Again, this third and final inquiry was undertaken with regard to all four
defendants. Id. at 809 ("[B]y J.[A.]W.'s own admission ... [he] never told Roberts
of the molestation nor sought her advice and counsel on the matter."); id. at 810
("[T]he record does not show that Appellee Bottorff 'undertook counseling [J.A.W.]
with regard to the child molestations that he was enduring."'); id. at 810 n.5 (with
regard to Chastain, the record "is silent concerning J.[A.]W. seeking advice on how
to get away from Bramblett"); id. at 811 ("J.[A.]W. contends Francis advised him
that at sometime in the future J.[A.]W. could move from Bramblett's home, but in
the meantime J.[A.]W. should pray to make sure his soul was saved.").
125. Id. at 813.
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The second issue the court addressed was whether the harm
to J.A.W. was foreseeable. 126 Here, the court's inquiry focused on
two factors: whether J.A.W. was a foreseeable victim and whether
the sexual abuse he endured was reasonably foreseeable. 127 The
court therefore "examine[d] what forces and human conduct
should have appeared on the scene, and... weigh[ed] the dangers
likely to flow from the challenged conduct in light of these forces
and conduct."128 When applied, this inquiry revealed that all four
defendants knew of J.A.W.'s sexual abuse while it was occur-
ring.129 The defendants consequently should have known that
their failure to report J.A.W.'s abuse "created an unreasonable risk
that the abuse would continue," making his further abuse foresee-
able.130
The third and final evaluation undertaken by the court con-
cerned public policy. 13 1 Though reluctant to create a common law
duty for all persons to report their knowledge of child sexual
abuse, 132 the court acknowledged that negligence law is malleable.
"Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection."'133 To this effect, the
court agreed with J.A.W.'s assertion that imposing civil liability
would encourage timely reporting of child sexual abuse and pre-
vent harms stemming from the failure to report.134 Furthermore,
126. Id. at 811.
127. Id. ("In analyzing the foreseeability component of duty, we focus on
whether the person actually harmed was a foreseeable victim and whether the
type of harm actually inflicted was reasonably foreseeable.").
128. Id. at 812 (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 812-13.
132. Id. at 813. Here, the court noted that the Indiana Legislature has already
made known its concern for child abuse victims by making it a Class B misde-
meanor for persons who knowingly fail to report suspected abuse to local protec-
tion and law enforcement agencies. Id. at 813. Like the majority of states, Indi-
ana's legislature has been reluctant to codify a civil remedy against knowing
adults who fail to report child sexual abuse. Id. Only Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa,
Michigan, Montana, New York and Rhode Island had codified such a law as of the
date on which J.A.W. was decided. Id. In the absence of such codification, the
court of appeals opined that to provide a civil action would "misdirect judicial time
and attention from the very real problems of children in need of services in favor of
pursuing collateral individuals, who are presumably capable of responding in
money damages, on the ground that they knowingly failed to make an oral re-
port."' J.A W., 627 N.E.2d at 813 (quoting Borne v. Northwest Allen County Sch.
Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)).
133. Id. at 812 (quoting Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991)
(citations omitted)).
134. Id. at 812-13.
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the court commented that "the foreseeability of continued abuse
weighs in favor of imposing a common law duty to report alleged
child abuse to the authorities." 135
After weighing the relationships, the issue of foreseeability,
and public policy considerations, the court held that defendant
Richard Francis may have had a duty to report J.A.W.'s abuse. 136
If Roberts enjoyed a special relationship with J.A.W., he would
necessarily have assumed a greater responsibility to report the
boy's abuse. 137 In support of this conclusion, the court emphasized
that special relationships are of the utmost importance to the child
who entrusts to another the secret of his or her abuse. 138 They im-
bue "to the child a sense of security and trust. For the child, the
stakes are high."'139 This responsibility, the court emphasized fur-
ther, is neither troublesome nor costly. 140 Indeed, "the adult is
committing an even greater disservice to the child when the adult
fails to make a report of the alleged abuse."' 4'
II. Examining the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore
In H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittenore,142 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that despite her knowledge of ongoing child sex-
ual abuse, 143 a trailer park manager owed no duty to report the
molestations of four child tenants. 44 Generally, the common law
does not recognize a duty to warn or protect others from harmful
third-party conduct.145 Exceptions to this rule arise only when an-
135. Id. at 812.
136. Id. at 813. Specifically, the court singled out Richard Francis as a defen-
dant upon whom a duty may be placed with regard to the reporting of J.A.W.'s




139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996).
143. Upon being informed of the alleged abuse, "Arndt responded by telling the
children to tell their parents, but they did not tell their parents right away. The
abuse continued for approximately another three weeks," until S.B. confided in her
mother, who then summoned the police. Id. at 707.
144. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 709-10 ('As regrettable as it is that Arndt did
not take the simple step of notifying the children's parents of Whittemore's con-
duct, we conclude that the factual circumstances did not create a duty on her to do
so."). See also supra note 143.
145. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (citing Minnesota case law sup-
porting the assertion that generally, there is no duty to warn or protect another
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other's harm is foreseeable and a special relationship exists be-
tween either the defendant and the party seeking protection, or
between the defendant and the party whose conduct must be con-
trolled. 146 Because the court refused to recognize a special rela-
tionship between the park manager and the girls, no duty to report
the girls' abuse was owed. 147
In determining whether Colleen Arndt, the rental park man-
ager, owed a duty to report the girls' abuse, the court focused
solely on whether a special relationship existed between the par-
ties. 148 The circumstances giving rise to a special relationsip in
Minnesota have been addressed by the supreme court on several
occasions. Most recently, in Erickson v. Curtis Investment Com-
pany,149 the duty to warn or protect was expanded to include own-
ers and operators of commercial parking ramps. 150 In Erickson,
the court found that unique circumstances compelled it to impose a
duty upon owner-operators of parking ramps to exercise reason-
able care in preventing criminal activity from occurring on-site. 51
Similarly, in Andrade v. Ellefson,152 a duty was placed on Anoka
County to protect children from an abusive day care provider. 5 3
from third-party conduct).
146. See supra note 12 (identifying special relationships as exceptions to the
general rule of no duty to warn or protect); see also H.B ex rel. Clarke v. Whitte-
more, 533 N.W.2d 887, 890-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding in part that "a duty
to warn and protect [exists] when: (1) the harm is foreseeable; and (2) a 'special
relationship' exists between either the defendant and the party whose conduct
needs to be controlled, or between the defendant and the foreseeable victims of the
third party's conduct") (citing Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 25 n.7 (Minn. 1982)).
147. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (referencing the Whittemore
court's finding of no special relationship and, hence, no duty).
148. See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707-10. The duty to warn or protect is con-
tingent upon the presence of two factors: a special relationship and foreseeable
risk. Id. at 707. By disproving the existence of a special relationship, the defen-
dants defeated the plaintiffs' claim of negligence, eliminating the need for a deter-
mination of whether the girls' abuse was foreseeable. Id. at 707-10.
Traditionally, relationships on which duties are imposed are those of common
carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, and hospital and patient. Whittemore,
553 N.W.2d at 708 (citing Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993)).
Exceptions to this rule "typically involve [relationships with) some degree of de-
pendence," making them "special." Id.
149. 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989).
150. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d. at 707-08 (discussing Erickson).
151. Id. Those unique circumstances included, among other things, the ramp's
accessibility, downtown location and natural attraction of car thieves. Id. Fur-
thermore, "[t]he parking ramp presented a 'particular focus or unique opportunity
for criminals and their criminal activities . . . to some degree . . . different from
that presented out on the street and in the neighborhood generally."' Id. at 708
(quoting Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169).
152. 391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986).
153. Id. at 842-43 ("[W]e held a duty existed on the part of Anoka County [in
Anadrade] . . . because of the county's licensure and inspection responsibilities.")
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The plaintiffs in Andrade were children in a child care program
with "little opportunity to protect themselves,"'154 thus giving rise
to a special relationship between the children and the county. 155
Conversely, no duty to warn or protect was found by the supreme
court in Harper v. Herman.156 There, the court held that no special
relationship existed between a boat owner and a guest who injured
himself while diving because the owner did not have custody of his
guest "under circumstances in which ... [the guest] was deprived
of normal opportunities to protect himself."'5 7 Likewise, in Don-
aldson v. Y.WC.A. of Duluth, 58 the court found that even though
the Y.W.C.A. had knowledge that a lodger was in danger of com-
mitting suicide, it had no duty to prevent the act. 59 In the ab-
sence of a caretaking or custodial relationship between the parties,
the Y.W.C.A. had no duty to protect the woman from killing her-
self.160
After comparing and contrasting the facts of Whittemore with
Erickson, Andrade, Harper and Donaldson, the court concluded
that "no special relationship came into existence between Arndt
and the children upon which to premise a duty."' 6 ' Foremost
among the Whittemore court's conclusions were three distinguish-
ing characteristics. First, unlike the defendants in Erickson,
Arndt did not accept the children's entrustment of their safety. 162
Rather, she specifically rejected the girls' entrustment by telling
them to report the abuse to their parents. 63 Second, in contrast
Andrade's holding had special relevance to Whittemore in that, as in Whittemore,
"the plaintiffs seeking protection were small children." Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d.
at 708.
154. Id. (discussing Andrade).
155. Id. at 842-43; see supra note 153.
156. 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993).
157. The Whittemore court recalled its holding in Harper:
Generally, a special relationship giving rise to a duty to warn is only
found on the part of common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of land who
hold it open to the public, and persons who have custody of another person
under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal op-
portunities of self-protection. Under this rule, a special relationship could
be found to exist between the parties only if Herman had custody of
Harper under circumstances in which Harper was deprived of normal op-
portunities to protect himself. These elements are not present here.
Whittemnore, 552 N.W.2d. at 707-08.
158. 539 N.W.2d at 789, (Minn. 1995).
159. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d. at 707-08 (discussing Donaldson).
160. Id. ("[E]ven where a Y.W.C.A.'s employee had actual knowledge that one of




163. Id. at 708-09 (discussing the Erickson decision, the Whittemore court held
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with the defendants in Andrade, Arndt never exercised control
over the girls' daily welfare. 164 She was merely the resident care-
taker of the Eaton Mobile Home Park165-nothing more.166  Fi-
nally, again contrary to the defendants in Andrade, Arndt did not
have custody of the children under circumstances in which they
were deprived of the opportunity to protect themselves. 16 7 In addi-
tion to finding that no custodial relationship existed, the court
deemed it questionable at best "that the children were unable to
protect themselves."'168 For eventually, the girls did protect them-
selves by reporting their abuse to their parents. 69
The court also dispelled notions that a special relationship
arose between Arndt and the children by statute. 70 Though rele-
vant, section 327.20, subdivision 1(1) of the Minnesota Code
merely requires trailer parks to make a resident caretaker avail-
able to park tenants at all times.' 7' In the court's words, the stat-
ute "provides no support whatsoever .. that from it a special rela-
tionship should arise between Arndt and the children which would
form the basis of a duty on Arndt to protect the children."172 Ap-
plication of the statute to find a special relationship therefore im-
that no special relationship-and hence no duty-existed between Arndt and the
children: "Unlike Erickson, here there was [among other things] no acceptance by
Arndt of the children's entrustment.... [lit was specifically rejected when Arndt
instructed the children to tell their parents about Whittemore's abuse.").
164. Id. at 709 ("Respondents' dependence on Andrade is . . . flawed because
even though the parties seeking protection in both cases [were] vulnerable chil-
dren, here the children were not in Arndt's custody, and unlike Andrade, she exer-
cised no control over their daily welfare.").
165. Id. ("[T]here is no dispute that Arndt was the [trailer park's] caretaker.").
166. Nothing in the factual record suggests that Arndt was the children's care-
taker or that she "had any authority or responsibility for the children." Id.
167. Id. In acknowledging the custody requirement, the Whittemore court re-
called its holding in Harper v. Herman, where it considered whether a special rela-
tionship existed between a boat owner and guest upon which to premise a duty.
Id. at 708 (citing Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993)). Holding that
no such relationship existed, the Harper court stated: "[A] special relationship
could be found to exist between the parties only if Herman had custody of Harper
under circumstances in which Harper was deprived of normal opportunities to pro-
tect himself." Id. at 708 (quoting Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474).
168. Id. at 709.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See MINN. STAT. § 327.20, subd. 1(1) (1996) ("A responsible attendant or
caretaker shall be in charge of every manufactured home park.., at all times....
In any manufactured home park containing more than 50 lots, the attendant, care-
taker, or other responsible park employee, shall be readily available at all times in
case of emergency.").
172. Whittemnore, 552 N.W.2d at 709.
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properly expands the statute's scope, amounting to "a legal misap-
prehension of the circumstances."173
III. A Roadmap for the Future
Whitteinore threatens to create a climate of social irresponsi-
bility disastrous to the lives of Minnesota's citizens. By failing to
appreciate the unique nature and social significance of child sexual
abuse, the supreme court's ruling severely limits victims' collective
ability to compel abuse reporting. Until such time as Whittemore's
test for special relationships in cases of child sexual abuse report-
ing is properly modified, Minnesota children will continue to suffer
unnecessarily from the primary and secondary effects of sexual
abuse.
The following analysis uncovers the erroneous assumptions
upon which Whittemore is based while simultaneously suggesting
a more reasoned roadmap for judicial evaluation of that case's
facts.
A. Minnesota's Common Law Test for Special Relationship:
An Obsolete Method of Determining Duties to Warn or
Protect in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
In determining whether Arndt owed a duty to protect the four
girls from being sexually abused by a third party, the Whittemnore
court focused exclusively on whether a special relationship existed
between Arndt and the girls. 174 Primarily, this inquiry sought to
determine if Arndt stood in a special position to the children under
circumstances in which they were deprived of normal opportuni-
ties of self-protection. 175 The degree of dependence between the
parties was therefore heavily scrutinized. 176 Specifically, the court
focused on whether Arndt had custody of the girls, 177 whether
Arndt had control over the girls' daily welfare 178 and whether
Arndt had accepted the entrustment of the girls' welfare. 179
173. Id.
174. Id. at 707-08.
175. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708.
176. Id. at 708 ("Instances where a special relationship has created a duty on
the part of a defendant to protect a plaintiff typically involve some degree of de-
pendence.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965)).
177. Id. at 708-09; see also supra notes 166-67and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 708-09; see also supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 709; see also supra text accompanying notes 162-63. The court's
main concern in evaluating these various elements was based on notions of liberty
and self-reliance. "An adult who does not stand in a caretaking relationship with a
child should not have thrust upon her an ill-defined legal responsibility to take
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As applied in Whittemore, Minnesota's current special rela-
tionship inquiry failed to contemplate the unique factual charac-
teristics of child sexual abuse victims. Despite the Whittemore
court's unsupported contention that the girls-all of whom were
under the age of eight' 8 0-should have taken "care of them-
selves,"'181 they were powerless to halt their sexual victimization. 182
Commentators agree that child sexual abuse renders its victims
both incapable of knowing that their abuse is wrong and of being
able to stop it.L8 3 Contrary to the court's opinion, the girls' de-
pendence upon Arndt for protection was therefore not misplaced.
By entrusting to Arndt knowledge of their sexual abuse, the girls
became dependent upon her for protection under circumstances in
which they were otherwise deprived of normal opportunities for
self-defense. Such circumstances regularly give rise to special re-
lationships and consequent duties to warn or protect. 184
Isome reasonable action' . . . because the child chose to report mistreatment to
her." Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 709.
180. See supra text accompanying note 1 (summarizing the circumstances sur-
rounding the girls' sexual abuse, including their ages when the abuse took place).
181. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 709. Justice Stringer, who authored the ma-
jority opinion in Whittemore, callously commented in dictum: "We recognize a
feeling of shame and fear about telling their parents... [of the abuse,] but we de-
cline to graft an exception to the common law rule of no duty simply because the
personal feelings of the victims might inhibit their taking care of themselves." Id.
The court, however, offered no support for the ability of such young victims to care
for themselves.
182. The unique vulnerability of the girls in Whittemore rendered them de-
fenseless. First, each of the girls was under eight years of age at the time of their
abuse. Id. at 707. Second, the girls' victimizer was an adult who exercised consid-
erable power over them by virtue of their "friendship." Id.; see also id. at 711
(Gardebring, J. dissenting).
183. In her dissent, Justice Gardebring admitted "that children are, as to sexual
abuse, deprived of the normal opportunities to protect themselves." Id. at 711
(Gardebring, J., dissenting). Justice Gardebring also observed that because MINN.
STAT. § 626.556, subd. 1 (1996) requires mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse
by certain individuals, it serves as a legislative acknowledgment that children are
generally incapable of stopping their own sexual abuse. Id. at 710 ('It is this pat-
tern of secrecy ... that is behind the requirement of state law that certain indi-
viduals with frequent contact with children are required to report to public
authorities any abuse described to them by children."). See also GRUBMAN-BLACK,
supra note 40, at vi (stating that whether termed "sexual abuse or sexual assault,"
the sexual victimization of children is always undertaken by someone "in a role of
power and control... toward a boy [or girl] who either didn't know it was wrong or
couldn't 'make it stop"'); KING, supra note 40, at 20 ("As children we [victims of
sexual abuse] learn to blame ourselves and keep our trauma secret .... Children
are utterly dependent, powerless, and unable to understand adult sexuality.");
BUTLER, supra note 40, at 5 (observing that "incestuous assault" refers to "sexual
contact or other explicit sexual behavior that an adult family member imposes on a
child, who is unable to alter or understand the adult's behavior because of his or
her powerlessness").
184. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (elucidating the proper cir-
cumstances under which special relationships are typically held to exist).
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The Whittemore court also erred by tacitly endorsing Arndt's
ability to refuse the girls' dependence on her for protection. 185 Al-
though customer-merchant relationships do not automatically cre-
ate duties to warn or protect,186 the duty elements of dependence
and acceptance have historically arisen from economic relation-
ships. 187 By transacting with each other, commercial actors are
presumed to consent to certain levels of protection as part of the
transaction's bargain. 88 But whereas the parties in economic rela-
tionships are presumed to have independent bargaining power, the
girls in Whittetnore were without the ability to actively bargain to
whom they could entrust knowledge of their abuse. 89 By allowing
Arndt to refuse the girls' entrustment, the court consequently
placed a wholly unrealistic burden on victims of child sexual
abuse' 90 -that they should continue to spread knowledge of their
abuse with the hope that, ultimately, someone might accept their
entrustment. Sexually abused children are both physically and
psychologically ill-equipped to fend for themselves in this market-
185. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09 (stating that the girls' entrustment of
their protection to Arndt "was specifically rejected when Arndt instructed the chil-
dren to tell their parents about Whittemore's abuse").
186. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (recalling the Erickson
court's recognition that economic relationships do not automatically create special
relationships).
187. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (tracing the origins of
"dependence" and "acceptance" to commercial transactions).
188. See id.
189. Despite the absence of statistical corroboration, the literature on child sex-
ual abuse divulges that a significant number of victims remain silent about their
abuse because of retaliatory threats made by their victimizers. See GRUBMAN-
BLACK, supra note 40, at 38 ("Sometimes the perpetrator will threaten to sabotage
or destroy an important relationship or harm the boy's parents. If you tell, it'll kill
your mother. If you tell, I'll hurt your parents, and then nobody will be around to
take care of you."); KING, supra note 40, at 12 ("Often the boy is threatened with
harm to himself or others if he 'tells' and is intimidated into keeping silent about
the abuse."). In instances of incest, the ability of children to halt their own abuse
is often further exacerbated by the politics of the family. BUTLER, supra note 40, at
12 ("But what happens when the assailant is an uncle, older brother or father? In
that situation, it is not so easy ... [to] know whom to protect and whom to defend,
especially if confronting the offender means that the family unit and its economic
foundation will be threatened.").
190. Recall that nearly half of all sex crimes committed by adults in Minnesota
in 1992 targeted children who, like the girls in Whittemore, were thirteen years of
age or younger. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (revealing that 46% of
all adult sex offenses committed in Minnesota in 1992 targeted children under the
age of fourteen). Nearly three-fourths of all juvenile sex offense in Minnesota in
1991 targeted that same age group. See supra note 31 and accompanying text
(revealing that 70% of all juvenile sex offenses committed in 1991 in Minnesota
targeted children under the age of fourteen).
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place of abuse reporting that the Whitteinore decision has cre-
ated.' 9'
Finally, in concluding that a duty to warn or protect was in
part contingent upon whether Arndt had actual custody of the
girls, 192 the court again disregarded the factual uniqueness of child
sexual abuse. In 1992, only 7% of all adult sex offenses reported in
Minnesota were perpetrated by persons who were strangers to
their victims. 193 That same year, 84% of adult sex offenses in-
volved victims under the age of eighteen. 194 Perhaps as many as
one-third of those adult sex abusers were living with their vic-
tim(s). 195 These statistics make evident that a significant percent-
age of child sexual abuse is committed each year by persons who
are actually charged with their victim's custody. By making the
duty to report child sexual abuse contingent in part upon custody,
the court asks custody-holders who abuse those in their charge to
report themselves. In effect, this absurd requirement ensures that
children being abused by their custody-holders are never owed a
duty to have their abuse reported and stopped. 196 Surely such
children need not be twice victimized-both by their custody-
holders and by the Whitteinore court's illogical devotion to custody
as a prerequisite to a duty to warn or protect.
B. J.A.W. v. Roberts: A Model for Determining Special
Relationships in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Like the Minnesota Supreme Court in H.B. ex rel Clarke v.
Whittemnore,197 the Indiana Court of Appeals in J.A.W. v. Roberts'98
191. See supra notes 40-41 (highlighting the mental and physical consequences
of child sexual abuse on its victims).
192. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (detailing the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's determination that custody is essential to duties to warn or protect).
193. See supra note 26 (concluding that in 1992, persons eighteen years of age
or older represented 16% of all victims of adult sex offenses in Minnesota).
194. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
195. This figure was inferred from the following statistics. Of adult sex offend-
ers convicted in 1992, 133 were either a parent or stepparent of their victim(s). Id.
at 14. Likewise, 38 were either a spouse of or a co-habitator with their victim(s).
Id. Finally, 97 adult offenders were described as "other family." Id. This total
number (268) was then divided by the total number of adult offenders (710). The
statistical result suggests that perhaps as many as 37% of all adult sex abusers
convicted in 1992 were living with their victims. Note: this information does not
include juvenile sex offense statistics for 1992 due to their unavailability. Cf. id.
at 12 (stating that in 1991, 193 of the 554 convicted juvenile sex offenders (totaling
34.8%) were family members of their victims).
196. This assertion applies only to common law requirements. The statutory
duty to report child abuse still applies under MINN. STAT. § 625.556. For the
statutory text, see supra note 37.
197. 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996).
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maintained that duties to warn or protect will not be imposed ab-
sent a special relationship between the parties involved. 199 But
unlike the Whitternore court, the J.A.W. court admitted that
whether a special relationship exists is "fact sensitive and depend-
ent on the level of interaction or dependency between the parties
that surpasses what is common or usual."20 0  In determining
whether a special relationship existed between J.A.W. and the de-
fendants, the J.A.W. court evaluated three factors: whether the
parties lived in the same household, whether there was specific
communication of the abuse between the parties and whether
J.A.W. sought advice or counsel from the defendants regarding the
abuse. 201 Rather than embody a rigid test, 202 these factors evinced
a sweeping investigation into whether, in fact, a special relation-
ship existed.
The J.A. W. court's special relationship inquiry is preferable to
that of the Whittemore court in three crucial ways. First, whereas
the Whittemore court premised the existence of a special relation-
ship in large part upon the presence of custody,20 3 the J.A.W court
implicitly acknowledged that custody is irrelevant.20 4 The omis-
sion of this criterion consequently allowed the J.A. W. court to
avoid the misbegotten assumption that those having custody of
children are not, themselves, the sexually abused child's worst en-
emy.205
Second, the J.A. W. analysis is a judicially honest acknowl-
edgment that interaction and dependency are "fact sensitive" is-
sues. 20 6 By rigidly adhering to common law precedent, 2 7 the Whit-
198. 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
199. Id. at 809 ("Absent a special relationship between a plaintiff and a defen-
dant, we will not impose a duty on the defendant to take affirmative steps to pre-
vent harm to the plaintiff.").
200. Id. at 810.
201. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (identifying the three main
inquiries undertaken by the J.A. W. court).
202. In acknowledging that no explicit test exists for determining the existence
of a special relationship, the J.A. W. court stated that "our research has revealed no
cases specifically defining the term 'special relationship."' 627 N.E.2d at 809.
203. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (detailing the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's determination that custody is essential to duties to warn or protect).
204. Not once did the J.A.W. court address the issue of custody when deter-
mining the existence of a special relationship between J.A.W. and the defendants.
J.A.W., 627 N.E.2d. at 809-11.
205. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (maintaining that a signifi-
cant percentage of child sexual abuse victims are abused by their custody-
holder(s)).
206. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (citing the J.A. W. court's asser-
tion that whether a special relationship exists is "fact sensitive").
207. See supra Part III.A (arguing that Minnesota's special relationship inquiry
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temore court's analysis was rendered obsolete in engaging the nu-
ances of child sexual abuse reporting.208 By contrast, the J.A.W
analysis undertook a boundless evaluation of whether a special
relationship existed between J.A.W. and the defendants. 20 9 This
flexible, fact-driven evaluation does justice to child sexual abuse
victims whose predicaments were not previously anticipated by
common law duty inquiries. 210
Finally, the J.A. W. analysis is desirable because it embodies a
moderate change in the common law. A primary concern involving
the duty to warn or protect is that liberty in general will be cur-
tailed by compelling persons to protect against conduct they did
not initiate.211 This fear is minimized by the subtle changes em-
bodied in J.A.W.212 Rather than create a general common law duty
for all people to report their knowledge of child sexual abuse, 21
3
J.A.W. stands for the modest proposition that previous common
law tests for the existence of a special relationship-including that
applied by the Whittemore court-are incapable of dealing with
child sexual abuse reporting. The J.A.W. analysis thus embraces
the special relationship requirement2 1 4 while simultaneously af-
fording greater latitude in determining the existence of a special
relationship.
When applied to the facts of Whitteinore, the J.A.W. analysis
seeks to determine whether the level of interaction and depend-
ence between Arndt and the girls surpassed what is common or
is an obsolete method of determining duties to warn or protect in cases of child
sexual abuse reporting).
208. See id.
209. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (recalling the sweeping spe-
cial relationship inquiry undertaken by the J.A.W. court).
210. While researching this topic, I was particularly struck by the seeming in-
nocence with which most commentaries on the common law duty to warn or pro-
tect have been written. Clearly, the application of this doctrine to child sexual
abuse reporting was not contemplated until recently. See supra notes 43-45 (citing
commentators whose evaluations of the duty to warn or protect do not contemplate
that doctrine's use in the reporting of child sexual abuse).
211. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (illustrating how the common
law seeks to promote rugged individualism).
212. These changes include the ways in which the J.A. W. special relationship
inquiry differs from that of Whittemore.
213. In addressing this very issue, the J.A.W court concluded that it was not
convinced "that extending a civil remedy to a victim of abuse or neglect against all
persons who know of child abuse and fail to report child abuse is good public pol-
icy." J.A. W., 627 N.E.2d at 813. Its primary concerns were that general liability
would misdirect the time and efforts of the courts from the more pressing matters
of children in need of services. Id.
214. See supra note 137-41 and accompanying text (referencing the special rela-
tionship analysis of the J.A. W. court).
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usual. 215 To that end, J.A. W. instructs that a broad inquiry may be
employed to uncover the factual circumstances surrounding the
relationship between Arndt and the four girls. Such an inquiry
may include, but is not confined to, a determination of whether the
parties lived together, whether they regularly shared communica-
tions, and whether they exchanged advice or counsel regarding the
molestations. 216
At first glance, it appears questionable whether the J.A.W
analysis uncovers a relationship between Arndt and the girls that
surpassed what is common or usual. Although the parties did not
live in the same household, they were neighbors living in the same
mobile home park.217 Similarly, Arndt and the girls were friends-
not mere acquaintances-who appeared very comfortable with and
used to their informal adult-child relationship. 218 Finally, the girls
specifically sought Arndt out at her home so as to receive advice
and counsel regarding their sexual victimization.219
Unlike in Whittemore, however, the special relationship
analysis in J.A.W. would allow admission of evidence of the par-
ties' relationship under section 327.20, subdivision 1(1) of the
Minnesota Code. That statute requires trailer parks to make a
resident caretaker available to park tenants at all times in case of
emergency. 220 The Whittemore court rejected use of the statute on
the grounds that it provided an insufficient basis upon which to
premise a special relationship between Arndt and the girls. 221 Ap-
215. J.A.W., 627 N.E.2d at 809 ("[Olur inquiry must focus on whether there ex-
isted a level of interaction or dependency... that surpasses what is common or
usual which we may characterize as a special relationship.").
216. See id. at 809-11; see also supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text
(highlighting the three-pronged, fact-driven special relationship inquiry of the
J.A. W. court).
217. H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore, 552 NW. 2d 705, 707 (Minn. 1996)
("[Tlhe children came to park manager Arndt's home and told her, in effect, that
Whittemore had been touching them in an inappropriate sexual manner.").
218. As one girl, S.B., explained in an interview with a police officer, her rela-
tionship with Arndt was that of friends-not mere park manager and tenant. "We
went over to Colleen's [Arndt's] house, my friend's house ... [tihat's the manager,
manager of the park, she said, if [Whittemore] doesn't stop it he'll be kicked out of
the park, and we're like, yes ... because he won't have to do it anymore all the
time." H.B ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at 887, 889 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995).
219. See id.; see also supra note 217.
220. For the text of MINN. STAT. § 327.20, subd. 1(1), see supra note 171.
221. See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 709 ("[A]s to the respondent's argument
that we should premise a special relationship on Minn. Stat. sec. 327.20, subd. 1(1)
(1996), requiring a trailer park to have a resident caretaker .... [tihe statute re-
quires nothing more and certainly provides no support whatsoever... that from it
a special relationship should arise."); see also supra note 171.
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plication of the J.A.W. analysis alleviates this concern by merely
evaluating the statute as evidence of the level of interaction be-
tween Arndt and the girls222-not as the sole basis upon which to
premise a special relationship. 223 When considered in this light,
the statute strongly suggests that a special relationship existed be-
tween Arndt and the girls. Because Arndt was the trailer park
manager, she was required by statute to be "readily available at all
times in case of emergency."224 She was the one to whom reports
of injury and crisis in the mobile home park were to be made.
Though not automatically creating a special relationship, this
statutory requirement provides further evidence that Arndt's rela-
tionship with the girls surpassed what is common or usual. When
evaluated together, these factors make evident that the girls' rela-
tionship with Arndt was "special" within the meaning of J.A. W.
C. Minnesota's Foreseeability Threshold Is Decisively
Satisfied in H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore
The Whitteinore court's conclusion that no special relation-
ship existed obviated "the need to address the issue of foreseeabil-
ity."225 Once judged to exist, however, a special relationship must
be accompanied by foreseeable harm in order for a duty to warn or
protect to exist.22 6 In Minnesota, foreseeability is satisfied when
courts find that specific threats have been made against specific
persons.227 As applied to Whittemore, foreseeability can only be es-
222. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (summarizing J.A.W.'s
analysis of whether the interaction between the parties involved surpassed what is
common or usual).
223. Evaluation of the statute in this manner was offered by Justice Gardebring
in her dissenting opinion:
I believe the existence of a duty to children living in the park is reinforced
by the statutory obligation on the park owner to provide a resident man-
ager .... [The statute] provides in part that '[a] responsible attendant or
caretaker shall be in charge of every manufactured home park' and fur-
ther that the caretaker 'shall be readily available at all times in case of
emergency.' Is there anyone who would not consider the ongoing criminal
sexual abuse of children an emergency to be dealt with expeditiously?
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 711 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
224. MINN. STAT. § 327.20, subd. 1(1) (1996).
225. See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 709 n.5; see also supra note 148
(acknowledging that by disproving the existence of a special relationship, the de-
fendants defeated Clarke's negligence claim, eliminating the need for a determina-
tion of whether the girls' abuse was foreseeable).
226. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (stating that the common law
generally does not recognize a duty to warn of or protect others from injurious
third-party conduct). But see Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707 (stating that excep-
tions to this rule arise when "the harm is foreseeable and a special relationship
exists between the actor and the person seeking protection") (citations omitted).
227. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (noting that in Minnesota,
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tablished if Arndt knew that the girls were specific targets of
Whittemore's sexual misconduct.
Fulfillment of the foreseeability threshold appears problem-
atic when merely considering Arndt's knowledge of Whittemore's
prior criminal history. 228 That Whittemore had previously mo-
lested children elsewhere evinced a statistical probability that he
would re-offend at the Eaton Mobile Home Park.229 But as previ-
ously held by the Minnesota Supreme Court, only specifically tar-
geted victims-not statistically probable victims-are owed duties
to warn or protect. 230 Consequently, the girls' abuse was not fore-
seeable when based solely on the defendants' knowledge of Whit-
temore's criminal history.
When evaluated in conjunction with the girls' specific report
of abuse, however, Arndt's knowledge of Whittemore's past deci-
sively satisfies the requisite level of foreseeability. The girls spe-
cifically sought Arndt out at her home to apprise her of Whitte-
more's unwelcome and inappropriate sexual touchings. 23 1 The
court of appeals properly concluded that this differentiated the
case from previous Minnesota duty to warn cases in that "the per-
son who could have intervened here had actual knowledge of the
damage that had already occurred and that would certainly con-
tinue to occur unless someone interceded on behalf of the chil-
dren."232 In light of the girls' specific report of abuse, Whittemore's
likelihood of reoffending at the Eaton Mobile Home Park was more
than probable-it was foreseeable.
D. Public Policy Reasons Favor Placing a Duty on Arndt to
Report the Girls'Abuse
Minnesota's most recent expansion of the common law duty
to warn or protect occurred in Erickson v. Curtis Investment Com-
pany,233 in which the court held that whether such a duty exists is
foreseeability is satisfied when specific threats are made against specific victims).
228. Recall that upon applying to become a tenant at the Eaton Mobile Home
Park, Whittemore "told Arndt that several years earlier he had pled guilty to a
charge of criminal sexual conduct after being accused of molesting several children
at the trailer park where he then lived." Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707.
229. See H.B. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995).
230. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (citing the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's definition of foreseeability).
231. See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707 ("In late July 1992, the children came
to park manager Arndt's home and told her, in effect, that Whittemore had been
touching them in an inappropriate sexual manner.").
232. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at 892.
233. 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989).
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ultimately a question of public policy. 2 34 When weighing policy
considerations, the Erickson court balanced three areas of concern:
whether imposing a duty to warn or protect would encourage vigi-
lantism, 235 whether causation problems would make the imposition
of such a duty unadministerable 2 6 and whether the costs of im-
posing that duty would ultimately outweigh the duty's benefits.237
Despite the clear acknowledgment in Erickson that public
policy concerns necessarily inform duty inquiries, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Whittemore addressed no such policy con-
cerns. 23 8 Instead, the court summarily stated that an adult who is
not a sexually abused child's caretaker should not have "thrust
upon her" a legal duty to report that child's abuse simply because
the child chose to inform her of it.239 Left wholly unaddressed was
the weighing of both conflicting types of social conduct at issue:
the ability of Arndt to escape liability for failing to report the girls'
abuse and the girls' ability to compel Arndt to stop their abuse by
requiring her to report it.
When applied to the Whittemore facts, the Erickson public
policy inquiry first seeks to determine whether requiring Arndt to
report her knowledge of the girls' sexual abuse would have en-
couraged vigilantism. 240 Surely it would not have. By finding that
Arndt owed the girls a duty to report their abuse, the Whittemore
court would not have required her to supply private police or law
enforcement measures. 241 Such a duty merely would have man-
234. Id. See also supra note 90 and accompanying text (recalling the Erickson
court's holding that public policy issues ultimately govern whether a duty to warn
or protect exists).
235. See Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169; see also supra notes 92-94 and accompa-
nying text (summarizing the first of three public policy evaluations in Erickson).
236. See Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169 (determining whether the failure to pro-
vide further security precautions "in fact permitted the crime to occur"). This goes
directly to the issue of causation, namely, whether the defendant's "failure to pro-
vide ... further security precautions (e.g., more guards, television monitors, and
signsy' was the cause of the plaintiffs injury. Id.
237. See id. (setting forth the "the cost-benefit equation" as the third policy con-
sideration and determining whether the costs of imposing a duty to post 24-hour
guards on ramp premises would be cost prohibitive for both ramp owner and cus-
tomer); see also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (summarizing the third
and final public policy evaluation in Erickson).
238. Despite the court's earlier admission in Erickson that the question of
whether a duty to warn exists is inherently one of public policy, the supreme court
never explicitly addressed public policy issues in Whittemore. See Whittemore, 552
N.W.2d at 705.
239. Id. at 709.
240. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (summarizing the first of
three public policy evaluations in Erickson).
241. The advocation of self-help remedies by shifting police duties to the private
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dated that Arndt forward her knowledge of the girls' abuse to per-
sons able to halt or investigate the abuse.242
The second Erickson policy inquiry concerns whether placing
a duty upon Arndt to report the girls' abuse lends itself to an effec-
tive causation determination. 243 As admitted by the Whittemore
court, the girls' abuse continued after they reported the abuse to
Arndt but stopped once their parents learned of the illegal sexual
activity.244 Determining causation in Arndt's case therefore pres-
ents little difficulty. The girls' abuse would have stopped earlier
had Arndt promptly conveyed her knowledge of the abuse either to
the girls' parents or to law enforcement officials. Causation is thus
established and easily determined despite judicial concerns to the
contrary.
The final and most comprehensive Erickson policy inquiry in-
volves whether a duty to warn, once placed on Arndt, survives the
"cost-benefit equation."245 On this point, the facts of Erickson and
Whittemore are in stark contrast. Unlike in Erickson, 246 the court's
duty inquiry in Whittetnore involved little potential for the defen-
dant to incur noticeable monetary costs. 247 By reporting the girls'
abuse, Arndt would merely have faced the prospect of losing Whit-
temore as a tenant. But it is equally plausible that Arndt stood to
lose more tenants-and money-by iwt reporting Whittemore's il-
legal activity. Furthermore, Minnesota's Child Abuse Reporting
Act completely immunizes Arndt and those similarly situated from
sector was deemed void by the Erickson court as against public policy. Erickson,
447 N.W.2d at 169-70.
242. As acknowledged by the Whittemore court, the only action required of
Arndt had a duty to warn been placed upon her would have been the conveyance of
her knowledge of the abuse to persons capable of stopping it. See Whittemore, 552
N.W.2d at 709-10 ("As regrettable as it is that Arndt did not take the simple step
of notifying the children's parents of Whittemore's conduct, we conclude that the
factual circumstances did not create a duty on her to do so.") (emphasis added).
243. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (summarizing the second of
three public policy evaluations in Erickson).
244. See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 707 (observing that after the initial abuse
was reported to Arndt, the girls' abuse continued "for approximately another three
weeks until August 22, 1992, when S.B. told her mother about it, and upon S.B.'s
mother reporting the abuse to the police...").
245. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169 ("Presumably we do not live in a risk-free so-
ciety; if this is so, a cost-benefit analysis is unavoidable."). See also supra note 43
and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of the plaintiffs and defendant's
interests).
246. See supra note 99 (discussing the costs of heightening security at the
parking ramp).
247. In neither the court of appeals decision nor the supreme court decision is
there a discussion of the potential for Arndt to incur financial loss upon reporting
the girls' abuse. See HB. ex rel. Clarke v. Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 705.
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potential civil or criminal liability resulting from reports of child
sexual abuse made in "good faith."2 48 Little, if any, monetary costs
could have resulted from placing upon Arndt a good faith duty to
report the girls' abuse.
The benefits to be derived from placing a duty on Arndt are
both numerous and of great social significance. The most obvious
benefit involves stopping the girls' abuse. Had Arndt swiftly
warned the girls' parents of Whittemore's conduct, the girls would
not have been subjected to another month of sexual abuse. 249
Though not easily quantifiable, one month less of physical and
psychological pain would have meant much to the lives and well-
being of the girls, all of whom were under the age of eight.250
No less weighty are the societal benefits to be harvested gen-
erally from placing a duty to warn upon Arndt and those like her.
Children under the age of thirteen are the overwhelming targets of
sex crimes in Minnesota. 251 But the harms stemming from that
abuse are felt by everyone. A national study reveals that persons
sexually abused as children have significantly greater propensities
to commit crimes later in life than persons who were never mal-
treated as children.252 In Minnesota, those secondary criminal ef-
fects are invariably absorbed by the greater state community. For
the sake of their children and of their communities, all Minneso-
tans have a compelling interest in demanding that persons such as
Arndt report their knowledge of child sexual abuse immediately.
248. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (stating that all persons making
good faith reports of child sexual abuse are immune from any resulting civil or
criminal liability).
249. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (explaining that the girls' abuse
continued for three weeks after their initial report to Arndt).
250. We may infer much from the following statement made by S.B. to a police
officer: "We went over to Collene's [Arndt's] house, my friend's house .. .[t]hat's
the manager, manager of the park, she said, if Bill doesn't stop it he'll be kicked
out of the park and we're like, yes ... because he won't have to do it anymore all
the time." Whittemore, 533 N.W.2d at 889 (emphasis added). For sources regard-
ing the physical and psychological effects of child sexual abuse, see supra note 40
and accompanying text. As explained by former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop,
"The physical and mental health consequences to ... children [who are sexually
abused] are simply overwhelming." Koop, supra note 41.
251. See supra notes 190 and accompanying text (recalling the specific percent-
ages of adult and juvenile sex offenses perpetrated against children under the age
of fourteen in 1992 and 1991, respectively).
252. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (outlining the specific ways
in which victims of child sexual abuse are more likely to commit crimes than are




Resolution of the core issues in Whitteinore necessarily in-
volves an informed evaluation of factual and public policy consid-
erations. The existence of a duty to warn or protect is not absolute
but, rather, dependent upon fact-specific circumstances. In seek-
ing to evaluate such circumstances, a broad inquiry is required to
fully appreciate the unique nature of the relationships between the
parties involved. This is especially true in cases of child sexual
abuse reporting.
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to recognize the impor-
tance of such an inquiry in Whitteinore. Rather than modify its
approach when determining special relationships in the area of
child sexual abuse reporting, the court blindly adhered to prece-
dent when reviewing a situation-the sexual abuse of children-
not previously contemplated by the common law. In so doing, the
court failed to take notice of the legal innovations of its neighbor
states, and compromised the safety of thousands of defenseless
Minnesota children.
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